Part 54

it in some sort has being.

* Reply to Objection 2: * Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality.

* Reply to Objection 3: * Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or virtue.

* Objection 1: * It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.

* Objection 2: * Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things alone." Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.

* Objection 3: * Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas: "It were better for him, if that man had not been born" (Mat. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.

* Objection 4: * Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.

* On the contrary, * It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first of created things is being."

* I answer that, * In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is p