Part 1237

flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of innocence.

* Reply to Objection 2: * The human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as will be explained later on (Q[97], A[2]); likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason.

* Reply to Objection 3: * Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11.

* Objection 1: * It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.

* Objection 2: * Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore neither did those virtues exist then.

* Objection 3: * Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues exist.

* Objection 4: * Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every virtue.

* Objection 5: * Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.

* On the contrary, * Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra Judaeos): "The prince of sin overcame Adam