Part 1948

ng it.

* Reply to Objection 2: * Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it does not always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not always feared.

* Reply to Objection 3: * Death and other defects of nature are the effects of the common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them as far as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when present; fear when threatening in the future.

* Objection 1: * It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract. ix), that "by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God." Now nothing but sin severs us from God; according to Is. 59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Therefore the evil of sin can be an object of fear.

* Objection 2: * Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4,6) that "we fear when they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when they are present." But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on account of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also fear the evil of sin.

* Objection 3: * Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good of virtue can be the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ix, 4): and the Apostle says (Gal. 5:10): "I have confidence in you in the Lord, that you will not be of another mind." Therefore fear can regard evil of sin.

* Objection 4: * Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (Q[41], A[4]). But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an evil of sin. Therefore fear does so likewise.

* On the contrary, * The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow."

* I answer that, * As stated above (Q[40], A[1]; Q[41], A[2]), as the object of