Part 2371

nses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm. xxxiii).

* Reply to Objection 4: * Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good, as stated above (Q[25], A[2]; Q[39], A[2]); and so those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil.

* Objection 1: * It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause of sin, as stated (A[5]). Therefore the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin, but increases it.

* Objection 2: * Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also increases rather than diminishes a sin.

* Objection 3: * Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore passion aggravates a sin.

* On the contrary, * The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12).

* I answer that, * Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or will, as stated above (AA[1],2; Q[10], A[3]); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the higher powers redou